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NOTES
Dormant Commerce Clause Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Protecting the Right To Be Free of Profectionist State
Action
Historically, plaintiffs challenging state commercial regulations on
the ground that they violate the commerce clause have brought their
actions under the Constitution itself. 1 However, some plaintiffs have
added an additional claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2 The practical
effect of presenting the constitutional issue under section 1983 is to
entitle prevailing plaintiffs to attorney fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 ("section 1988"). 3 However, the
plaintiffs in Private Truck Council of America v. Secretary of State 4
learned that success on the merits of the constitutional claim does not
guarantee a recovery of attorney fees. In that case a class of out-ofstate truck drivers successfully challenged Maine's reciprocal truck
tax as a violation of the commerce clause. 5 Yet the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine refused to award attorney fees. The court maintained
that a violation of the commerce clause does not give rise to a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since the plaintiffs had failed to
meet this section 1988 threshold requirement, they were not entitled to
attorney fees. 6
1. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 556 F. Supp. 740, 743 (S.D. Iowa 1983), ajfd.,
730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984). Jurisdiction for challenges brought
directly under the Constitution is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), which grants jurisdiction
over general federal questions.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State ... , subjects ... any [person
within the jurisdiction of the United States] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Section 1988 provides for the allowance of reasonable attorney
fees as part of the costs "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [42 U.S.C. § ]
1983."
Because this statute permits an award of attorney fees "in any action ... to enforce " § 1983,
this Note will focus on the requirements of a cognizable § 1983 claim without considering
whether there might be other limits to recovering attorney fees in this context. For example, it
has been held that the prevailing party "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special
circumstances would render such an award unjust." Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel,
556 F. Supp. 740, 741 (S.D. Iowa 1983) (quoting Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir.
1980)), ajfd., 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984). Thus special circumstances, like the plaintiff's status as a wealthy corporation rather than an indigent needing some
incentive to sue, might preclude an award.
4. 503 A.2d 214 (Me.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1997 (1986).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. 503 A.2d at 221.
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The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue
of whether commerce clause violations are cognizable actions under
section 1983, and the Court recently denied the plaintiffs' petition for a
writ of certiorari in Private Truck Council. 7 Justice White, joined by
Justices Brennan and O'Connor, noted the existence of a conflict
among the lower federal courts on this issue and dissented from that
denial. Justice White observed that both the Third Circuit8 and the
District Court for the District of Montana9 have suggested that commerce clause violations give rise to section 1983 claims, while the
Eighth Circuit 10 has explicitly rejected the assertion that such violations are cognizable under section 1983. Justice White and his fellow
dissenters would have granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.
This Note will attempt to show that some commerce clause violations11 should give rise to cognizable section 1983 claims. 12 Two fundamental questions will be addressed: Is the commerce clause the
source of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti7. 106 S. Ct. 1997 (1986).
8. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
9. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1975),
ajfd. on other grounds, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
10. See Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. de11ied, 469
U.S. 834 (1984).
11. This Note will only consider whether claims arising under the "dormallf commerce
clause" doctrine arc cognizable under § 1983. That doctrine, growing out of the case of Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), posits that the commerce clause, which on
its face is only a specific grant of legislative power to Congress, also restricts the power of the
states to enact certain commercial regulations even when Congress has not exercised its power to
enact a uniform national regulation on the particular subject. See Consolidated Freightways
Corp. v. Kassel, 556 F. Supp. 740, 746 (S.D. Iowa 1983), ajfd., 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert.
de11ied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984); see also Eule, Layi11g the Dormallt Commerce Clause to Rest, 91
YALE L.J. 425, 425 n. l (1982) (describing the evolution of the phrase "dormant commerce
clause" as a recognized term of art).
Claims arising under the dormant commerce clause are to be distinguished from challenges to
state commercial regulations that are in direct conflict with existing congressional regulations.
See, e.g. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210, 239·40 (1824) (New York laws granting
exclusive steamboat navigation rights struck down because in conflict with congressional regula·
tions of the coasting trade). Such direct conflicts between federal and state power are resolved by
the supremacy clause in favor of federal law. However, the supremacy clause does not gra11t any
particular right in these circumstances; it merely vindicates the greater authority of the federal
enactment, which may or may not create "rights" protected by§ 1983. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); notes 18-25 i11fra and accompanying text. The
argument of this Note that the dormant commerce clause doctrine acts to protect an individual
right of constitutional magnitude, see Part II infra, may not extend to these "nondormant"
claims.
12. Plaintiffs attempting to have state laws struck down as violations of the dormant commerce clause under § 1983 can only receive prospective injunctive relief. Damages actions
against a state are prohibited by the eleventh amendment. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). But states may be held liable for attorney fees
in § 1983 actions. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). Thus it seems that commerce
clause violations could be cognizable under§ 1983 for the purposes of satisfying the threshold
requirement of§ 1988 and recovering attorney fees. For a discussion of the differences between
suing a state for damages and seeking attorney fees under § 1983, see Eisenberg, S<!ctio11 I 983:
Doctri11al Fou11datio11s a11d 011 Empirical Study, 61 CORNELL L. RHV. 482, 488 (1982).
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tution?" and if so, Does section 1983 protect whatever "rights, privileges, or immunities" grow out of the commerce clause? Part I will
describe the present status of authority on this issue and argue that
none of the conflicting opinions have adequately addressed the fundamental questions involved. Part II will demonstrate that the commerce clause does indeed protect a "right[], privilege[ ], or
immunit[y]." Finally, Part III will maintain that the plain language of
the statute and several Supreme Court decisions support the conclusion that the violation of any right secured by the Constitution gives
rise to a section 1983 remedy.
I.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF AUTHORITY

The existing judicial discussions of the relationship between the
commerce clause and section 1983 are inadequate because they have
not fully explored whether or not the commerce clause secures any
"rights, privileges, or immunities" as required by section 1983. Those
courts which have held that commerce clause violations do not give
rise to cognizable claims under section 1983 have recognized that
"benefits" may be conferred on individuals by the protections of the
commerce clause. 13 Yet they do not attempt to identify the nature of
the benefits conferred, and they do not convincingly explain why those
benefits are not "rights . . . secured by the Constitution" within the
meaning of section 1983. Similarly, those courts that have maintained
that commerce clause violations are cognizable under section 1983
simply assert that proposition without further analysis. No discussion
of whether the commerce clause secures any "rights, privileges, or immunities" is presented. 14
In reaching its decision in Private Truck Council, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine adopted the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel. 15 The Consolidated Freightways
court pointed out that not every case arising under the Constitution
13. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139, 1145 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 834 (1984); Private Truck Council of Am. v. Secretary of State, 503 A.2d 214, 221
(Me.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1997 (1986).
14. See text at notes 42-46 infra.
15. Private Truck Council, 503 A.2d at 221; see also J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie,
767 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985); Private Truck Council of Am. v. State, 128 N.H. 466, 517 A.2d
1150 (1986) (both adopting the reasoning of Consolidated Freightways); Connor v. Rivers, 25 F.
Supp. 937 (N.D. Ga. 1938), affd., 305 U.S. 576 (1939). The district court in Connor, by per
curiam opinion, denied jurisdiction because the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the amount in c01i-.
troversy requirement of the jurisdictional statute. The court also rejected plaintiff's attempt to
establish jurisdiction under the jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983 (28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) which has no amount in controversy requirement). The court said, "While there is an allegation
about the Georgia statute's interfering with interstate commerce, it is clear that there is no claim
or evidence that said Georgia Statute deprives the petitioner 'of any right, privilege, or immunity,
secured by the Constitution of the United States .... ' " 25 F. Supp. at 938. No further analysis
was presented. The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion.
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falls within section 1983. 16 For example, the Supreme Court has held
that the supremacy clause 17 alone does not give rise to a claim "secured by the Constitution." 18 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the
commerce clause and supremacy clause are analogous, since both limit
the power of the states to interfere with areas of national concern. 19
The court reasoned further that the commerce clause allocates
power between the state and federal governments without establishing
any individual rights against government. 20 The court asserted that
any benefits conferred on individuals indirectly through the protection
of the dormant commerce clause are not "rights" within the meaning
of section 1983. This is so, the Eighth Circuit believes, because dormant commerce clause litigation is really concerned with "the relative
jurisdiction of nation and state," 21 and because the origins of section
1983 indicate a desire to "enforce the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment" in the violent atmosphere of the post-Civil War
South. 22 The court also dismissed Supreme Court references to a constitutional "right" to engage in interstate commerce as "mere dict[a]"
or as peripheral discussions in opinions focusing on "the separation of
powers between the national and state legislatures. " 23
16. Consolidated Freig/ztways, 730 F.2d at 1143.
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
18. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 615 (1979) (construing 28
U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), the jurisdictional counterpart of§ 1983); see also Consolidated Freightways,
730 F.2d at 1143; Gould v. Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 750 F.2d 608,
616 (7th Cir. 1984), ajfd., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) (citing both Chapman and Consolidated Freight-

ways).
Of course, it is technically true that the Supreme Court relies on the supremacy clause whenever it invalidates a state statute. This is true when the statute conflicts with a provision of the
U.S. Constitution no less than when it conflicts "only" with a federal statute. However, precisely
because the supremacy clause governs all situations of conflicting authority, it cannot be said to
secure any one particular right independent of whatever rights may be secured by the prevailing
federal provision.
Because they could not meet the "amount in controversy" requirement that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, the general federal question jurisdictional statute, contained until 1980, see Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96486, 94 Stat. 2369, the Chapman plaintiffs were attempting to establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). This latter section,
however, required them to show that they were vindicating a constitutional right. The Court's
response to their supremacy clause argument was thus simply that a statutory entitlement does
not attain constitutional stature simply because it is the supremacy clause which resolves the
statutory conflict in favor of federal authority. See Chapman, 411 U.S. at 612-15.
19. The Eighth Circuit noted:
Although the Commerce Clause differs from the Supremacy Clause in that the Commerce Clause is a specific grant of legislative power to Congress, the two clauses are analogous in the sense that both clauses limit the power of a state to interfere with areas of
national concern. Just as the Supremacy Clause does not secure rights within the meaning
of § 1983, neither does the Commerce Clause.
Consolidated Freiglztways, 730 F.2d at 1144 (footnotes omitted).
20. 730 F.2d at 1144.
21. 730 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power. 27 VA. L.
REV. 1, 23 (1940)).
22. 730 F.2d at 114546.
23. 730 F.2d at 1145.
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There are a number of weaknesses in this analysis. First, the
court's comparison of the commerce and supremacy clauses may not
be entirely appropriate. The Supreme Court, in Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Organization, 24 explained that the supremacy clause
was not the "source" of any federal rights. Thus "an allegation of incompatibility between federal and state statutes and regulations does
not, in itself, give rise to a claim 'secured by the Constitution.' " 25 In
contrast, the commerce clause may itself be the source of some federal
right, privilege, or immunity. 26 The Eighth Circuit comes close to recognizing this possibility in its assertion that the dormant commerce
clause doctrine is the source of "benefits" to individuals, but the court
does not attempt to articulate the nature of these benefits. This is inadequate, because only after such an attempt has been made could it
convincingly conclude that such benefits do not rise to the status of
section 1983 rights.
Moreover, the court's attempt to link the interpretation of section
1983 to its original purposes in the post-Civil War era is analytically
incomplete in light of the extension of both the fourteenth amendment
and section 1983 to issues quite different from the Klan atrocities and
other incidents of racial violence that concerned post-Civil War legislators.27 Finally, the court emphasizes that the function of the commerce clause is to allocate power between the federal and state
governments. The court seems to assume that power allocation and
protection of rights are mutually exclusive. Yet this assumption is unreasonable, since a single provision might both allocate power and secure rights, privileges, or immunities for people. 28
24. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
25. 441 U.S. at 613, 615 (emphasis added).
26. See Part II infra.
27. See Part III.A infra.
28. Cf. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 556 F. Supp. 740, 747 (S.D. Iowa 1983),
ajfd., 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984). The district court there rejected plaintiff's argument that allocating power and securing rights are not mutually exclusive.
The court asserted that constitutional power-allocating provisions "are qualitatively different
from constitutional provisions which are normally viewed as securing rights." Issues of power
allocation (federalism) are matters of practicality, while individual liberties (rights) are matters of
principle. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 201-02
(1980).
Choper describes matters of principle as those in which "our historic ideals and special regard
for the dignity of the individual ... compel the collective will to subjugate its more immediate
needs [for effective government] to the preservation of designated individual rights." Id. at 201.
In contrast, federalism issues raise a pragmatic question of comparative skill and utility:
"whether, as a functional matter, the states are separately capable of effecting the desired result."
Id. at 202.
This "qualitative difference," however, is insufficient to defeat the claim that the commerce
clause can both allocate power and secure rights. The dormant commerce clause doctrine is not
simply a federalism issue of the sort described by Professor Choper. State commercial regulations are struck down under the dormant commerce clause not because they are inefficient, but
because they treat outsiders in an impermissible manner. Outsiders cannot be made the victims of
purposeful economic protectionism or discrimination. See text at notes 77-87 infra. This anti-
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Two lower court decisions oppose the Eighth Circuit position and
assert that commerce clause violations are cognizable under section
1983. 29 In Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, the court
held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)30 to hear the
claims of individual tribe members31 that a Montana cigarette sales tax
was unconstitutional as applied to them. 32 The tribes maintained that
the cigarette tax, imposed on sales by Indians to Indians within the
bounds of the reservation, was a violation of their rights of tribal sovereignty, secured in part by the commerce clause. 33 While recognizing
that section 1983 was enacted primarily to enforce the fourteenth
amendment, the court had "no difficulty in holding that plaintiffs' alleged violation of commerce clause rights is sufficient to state a claim
under§ 1983," 34 thus giving rise to jurisdiction under section 1343(3).
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the Supreme Court's
statement in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 35 that the "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured ... by the Constitution and laws of
the United States" include not only fourteenth amendment rights, but
also rights under "all of the Constitution and laws of the United
States." 36
With similar ease, the court in Kennecott Corp. v. Smith 37 conprotectionist principle preserves the "concept of Union," not uniformity in regulation or economic efficiency. See notes 79-83 infra and accompanying text. Just as Choper's principles of
individual liberty thwart the collective will in order to preserve human dignity, so too the dormant commerce clause subjugates the more immediate needs of individual states by protecting
individuals from protectionist legislation in order to preserve our notion of a federal union.
29. Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 {3d Cir. 1980); Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Mont. 1975), ajfd. on other grounds, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
30. In 1979, Congress redesignated § 1343(3) as § 1343(a)(3). See Act approved Dec. 29,
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284. Both § 1343(a)(3) and its predecessor provide that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person ... (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law •.. of
any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States .... " This
statute thus serves as the jurisdictional counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
31. Jurisdiction over the claims brought by the tribes themselves was based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362, which deals specifically with claims "brought by any Indian tribe or band." 392 F. Supp.
at 1303-04.
32. 392 F. Supp. at 1304.
33. Presumably, this application of the state tax is disallowed by the commerce clause. "The
Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with ... the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Kootenai, 392 F. Supp. at 1301. The tribes' rights were also secured by the
Hellgate Treaty and the Montana Organic and Enabling Acts. 392 F. Supp. at 1304.
34. 392 F. Supp. at 1305.
35. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
36. 405 U.S. at 549 n.16 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 797 (1966)). The
"rights, privileges, or immunities" language construed by the Court in Lynch parallels the text of
§ 1983. See note 2 supra. The Court in Price was interpreting language in §§ 241 and 242 of the
Federal Criminal Code (18 U.S.C. §§ 241 & 242) identical to that of their civil counterpart,
§ 1983: "Both include rights or privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Neither is qualified or limited. Each includes, presumably, all of the Constitution and
laws of the United States." 383 U.S. at 797.
37. 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
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eluded that commerce clause violations were cognizable under section
1983. Kennecott brought suit challenging the New Jersey Corporation Takeover Bid Disclosure Law, 38 seeking a declaratory judgment
that the law was unconstitutional and an injunction restraining enforcement of the statute. On appeal the defendants argued that the
anti-injunction act3 9 precluded a federal court from granting such relief. The court decided that the anti-injunction provision did not apply to Kennecott's claim because section 2283 contained an explicit
exception for section 1983 actions "such as this case."40 This conclusion was explained in a footnote: "The present action is properly
brought under§ 1983 because it seeks redress for deprivations of constitutional rights secured by the commerce clause and of federal statutory rights protected by the Williams Act. See Maine v. Thiboutot." 41
It is easy to see why the Eighth Circuit found these cases to be so
unpersuasive. 42 Neither opinion directly discusses what rights, if any,
the commerce clause secures. Without first identifying such a right,
the precedents relied upon by the Kootenai and Kennecott courts do
not support their conclusions, since those precedents devote no discussion to the commerce clause. For example, in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 43 the plaintiff brought suit under sections 1983 and
1343(3) challenging the validity of a summary prejudgment garnishment statute. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, claiming that section 1343(3) applied only when "personal" rather than "property" rights were impaired. The Supreme
Court expressly rejected such a distinction: "This Court has never
adopted the distinction between personal liberties and proprietary
rights as a guide to the contours of§ 1343(3) jurisdiction."44 Thus,
the district court could properly have exercised jurisdiction. While
this statement shows the Court's willingness to extend sections 1983
and 1343(3) beyond "personal" rights, it does not provide any gui38. N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 49:5-1 to -19 prohibit commencement of a tender offer until at least
twenty days after its announcement. The Third Circuit's opinion in Kennecott does not describe
the nature of Kennecott's commerce clause claim. It merely states that the action sought "redress for deprivations of constitutional rights secured by the commerce clause .... " 637 F.2d at
186 n.5. Presumably the claim is based on the alleged conflict between the New Jersey statute
and the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)·(f) (1982). The Williams Act is the
source of federal tender offer regulation and was enacted pursuant to Congress' power to regulate
interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b).
39. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
40. Kennecott, 637 F.2d at 186 (relying on Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)).
41. 637 F.2d at 186 n.5. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 45 & 46 infra.
42. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).
43. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
44. 405 U.S. at 542.
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dance in determining whether the commerce clause secures any rights
at all.
In Maine v. Thiboutot 45 the Court was considering section 1983 in
relation to federal statutory rights, not those secured by the Constitution. The Court there held that state violations of the Social Security
Act were cognizable under section 1983. Previous cases suggested to
the Court, "explicitly or implicitly, that the § 1983 remedy broadly
encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional
law." 46 Thiboutot itself concerned statutory rights, but the Court's
statement implies that section 1983 "broadly encompasses" two sorts
of violations: violations of rights established by the Constitution as
well as of rights under federal statutes. This breadth of coverage could
include rights established by the commerce clause (if any exist) as easily as those stemming from the Social Security Act. However, while
both Lynch and Thiboutot demonstrate the potential for expansive interpretation inherent in section 1983, neither opinion adequately supports the conclusion that commerce clause violations merit section
1983 protection; courts must first demonstrate that the commerce
clause actually secures rights. Part II addresses this question.

II.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A RIGHT-SECURING PROVISION

The commerce clause serves to allocate power between the national and state govemments.47 It gives Congress the ultimate authority to regulate interstate commerce, displacing conflicting state
regulations, without completely divesting the states of power over
commercial regulation. 48 Nevertheless, it may at the same time be the
source of an individual right, privilege, or immunity.
Consideration of four factors illustrates that the commerce clause
is a right-securing provision. First, the Supreme Court's references to
a right under the commerce clause to engage in commerce demonstrate that the commerce clause has been seen as a right-securing provision. Second, the doctrine of standing in the federal courts, which
generally precludes litigants from invoking the rights of third parties,
suggests that individual plaintiffs bringing commerce clause suits must
be asserting the violation of one of their own rights. Third, contemporary dormant commerce clause theory highlights the protection from
discriminatory or protectionist state commercial regulation that the
commerce clause gives to individuals. Finally, the relationship between the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause49
45.
46.
47.
48.
statute
49.

448 U.S. I (1980).
448 U.S. at 4.
See Consolidated Freightways. 730 F.2d at 1144; Dowling, supra note 21, at 22-23.
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (upholding a state
regulating the sale of petroleum products imported into Maryland from out of state).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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supports the conclusion that the commerce clause serves to secure individual rights as well as to allocate power.
A.

The Right To Engage in Commerce

It should not be surprising that the commerce clause might secure
an individual right, since references to a right to engage in interstate
commerce are quite persistent in our constitutional history. Such a
right is first mentioned in Gibbons v. Ogden, 50 but received no extensive attention until the Court decided Crandall v. Nevada 51 in 1867.
Nevada imposed a tax of one dollar on every person leaving the state
by any vehicle engaged in transporting passengers for hire. 52 The
Supreme Court struck down the tax, because it infringed the right of
the citizen to have free access to the seat of government (a right secured by the "privileges or immunities" clause of the fourteenth
amendment53). Justice Clifford, however, argued in dissent that the
tax should be struck down because it conflicted with the commerce
clause: "I am clear that the State legislature cannot impose any such
burden upon commerce among the several States. Such commerce is
secured against such legislation in the States by the Constitution, irrespective of any Congressional action." 54
An individual right to engage in commerce, secured by the commerce clause, was explicitly recognized in Crutcher v. Kentucky 55 and
50. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824):
[I]t has been said, that the constitution does not confer the right of intercourse between State
and State. That right derives its source from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by
civilized man throughout the world. This is true. The constitution found it an existing
right, and gave to Congress the power to regulate it.
22 U.S. at 211. See also Note, The Commerce Clause: Allocating Provision or Individual Right?, 7
U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L.J. 757 (1984).
51. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
52. The statute was challenged by an agent of a stage coach company (who refused to report
the number of passengers carried out of state) as an unconstitutional interference with Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce. The Court rejected this argument, but struck down the
tax because it impaired the right of every citizen to travel to the seat of government (protected by
the fourteenth amendment's "privileges or immunities" clause). Similarly, the citizen "has the
right to free access to [the nation's] seaports, through which all the operations of foreign trade
and commerce are conducted ... and this right is in its nature independent of the will of any
State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it." 73 U.S. at 44.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... "
54. 73 U.S. at 49.
55. 141 U.S. 47 (1891). The Court in Crutcher struck down a Kentucky statute imposing a
minimum capitalization requirement on out-of-state express companies wishing to obtain licenses
to do business in the state. Justice Bradley stated that regulation of this sort of commerce was
primarily the responsibility of Congress. He went on to hold that "[t]o carry on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by the State; it is a right which every citizen of the
United States is entitled to exercise under the Constitution and laws of the United States." 141
U.S. at 57. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 7-4, at 423 (1978) (mentioning that the right to carry on interstate commerce is recognized in Crutcher).
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Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas. 56 Both cases used strong language to protect "the substantial rights of those engaged in interstate
commerce. " 57 The Court protected the plaintiff corporations' "privilege to engage in" interstate commerce58 from impermissible burdens,
and declared that those plaintiffs did not have to surrender their constitutional rights under the commerce clause "any more than [they]
would have been bound to surrender any other right secured by the
National Constitution." 5 9
This sort of "rights talk" is not an archaic relic of the Lochner era;
similar language can be found in the more recent case of Garrity v.
New Jersey. 60 In the course of holding that police officers could not be
compelled to give self-incriminating testimony as an alternative to losing their jobs, the Garrity Court said, "There are rights of a constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction
of a price. Engaging in interstate commerce is one. Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1." 61 Thus it is evident that the commerce
56. 216 U.S. 1 (1910). In Western Union, foreign corporations were required to pay a charter
fee before they could engage in local business in the state. Similar requirements were not imposed on Kansas corporations. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, emphasized the "diligence
and firmness" with which the Court had guarded the freedom of interstate commerce against
hostile state and local action. 216 U.S. at 26. Kansas' statutory requirement had to be struck
down, because it was an impermissible burden on Western Union's interstate commerce and "its
privilege to engage in that commerce." 216 U.S. at 37. The position of the Court was summed
up in these words:
The company was not bound, under any circumstances, to surrender its constitutional exemption from state taxation, direct or indirect, in respect of its interstate business and its
property outside of the State, any more than it would have been bound to surrender any
other right secured by the National Constitution.
216 U.S. at 48.
57. 216 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added).
58. 216 U.S. at 37.
59. 216 U.S. at 48. Obviously, the Court was not at all reluctant to talk about a right to
engage in commerce, and it did so using language strikingly similar to that employed in section
1983. "It is of the last importance that the freedom of interstate commerce shall not be trammelled or burdened by local regulations which, under the guise of regulating local affairs, really
burden rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." The right of states to
regulate their domestic affairs "must always be exerted in subordination to the granted or enumerated powers of the General Government, and not in hostility to rights secured by the
Supreme Law of the Land." 216 U.S. at 37-38.
60. 385 u.s 493 (1967).
61. 385 U.S. at 500. The opinion then referred to a number of rights of presumably equal
constitutional stature: the right to assert diversity of citizenship to obtain access to the federal
courts, the guarantees of the first amendment, and the twenty-fourth amendment right to vote in
national elections without paying a poll tax. The right to be free from self-incrimination also is at
that level of importance, since the Court held that "the protection of the individual under the
Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use ... of statements obtained
under threat of removal from office, [and] extends to all, whether they are policemen or other
members of our body politic." 385 U.S. at 500.
The Eighth Circuit in Consolidated Freiglztways dismissed this discussion in Garrity as "mere
dictum." 730 F.2d at 1145. However, the Garrity reference is a strong statement included in nn
important analogy which seems to equate the commerce clause right with those secured by the
first and fourteenth amendments.
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clause has been explicitly recognized as a right-securing provision frequently in our constitutional history.

B. Standing in Commerce Clause Challenges
The ability of individual plaintiffs to bring suit under the commerce clause on their own behalf, in light of the Court's standing requirements for federal litigants, also suggests that some individual
right must be at stake. This proposition would be questioned by some
commentators, who maintain that even though dormant commerce
clause litigation is initiated by private parties, it is in reality the relative jurisdiction of the federal and state governments that is at issue. 62
But if dormant commerce clause litigation is about that alone, it is
difficult to see how private plaintiffs could ever satisfy the existing
standing requirements.
The standing doctrine currently applied in the federal courts has
two components: the article III "case or controversy" requirement, 63
and a set of judicially fashioned prudential requirements. 64 The article
III requirement dictates that the only plaintiffs who may bring suit are
those who can personally allege some actual or threatened injury that
is fairly traceable to the defendant's supposedly illegal conduct and
that is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. 65 This requirement is satisfied by dormant commerce clause plaintiffs; they typically
have suffered some economic injury due to state commercial regula62. See Dowling, supra note 21, at 22-23. See also Choper, The Scope ofNational Power Visa'-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977). Choper
maintains:
[T]he person attacking state and local laws is asserting the interests of the central government, not his own constitutionally secured liberties.
It may be that considerations of standing should preclude the litigant from asserting
such third-party interests even though the underlying substantive issue is adjudicable. But
the weight of the argument appears to favor a grant of standing: because of judicial practice,
Congress has implicitly authorized this method for securing the Court's protection of important federal interests ....
Id. at 1587 n.194.
Yet this "implicit authorization" does not preclude the simultaneous judicial protection of
individual interests. Individual and federal interests need not be mutually exclusive. Choper
himself recognizes that individual interests are also at stake. He thinks the Court should continue to review state commercial regulations, because such legislation can adversely affect "the
federal government or persons engaged in illlerstate activities . . . . The phenomenon is most
clearly exemplified by laws that discriminate against outsiders to the benefit of local interests,
either private or governmental." Id. at 1585 (emphasis added). It may be the existence of these
personal interests which makes acquiescence in dormant commerce clause litigation by individual plaintiffs more easily acceptable. While speaking in terms of protecting federal interests, the
judicial practice which has granted individuals standing in dormant commerce clause litigation
might be an implicit recognition that individual rights are at stake.
63. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
64. "The term 'standing• subsumes a blend of constitutional requirements and prudential
considerations .... " Valley Forge Christian Community College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498 (1975)).
65. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.
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tions and easily meet this standard. 66
In addition to those mandated by the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has imposed a number of prudential requirements. 67 Thus even
if the article III conditions are met, "a plaintiff may still lack standing
under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid
deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights
would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim." 68 The imposition of
these prudential principles cuts against the argument that dormant
commerce clause plaintiffs are merely asserting the interests of Congress against the states. They cannot solely be raising Congress' interests because the Court has held that plaintiffs must generally assert
their own legal rights and interests, not those of third parties. 69 Similarly, the Court has required that the plaintiff's complaint fall within
"the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question." 70 Allowing individual plaintiffs
to bring suit under the commerce clause in the face of this rule suggests that some individual right is within "the zone of interests" protected by the commerce clause.
Supreme Court discussion of standing in dormant commerce
clause cases does not refer to the individual plaintiff as a representative
of congressional or national interests. Rather, it is assumed that some
private, individual right is at stake. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commission, 71 for example, the Court addressed the issue
of whether the Commission had standing to challenge a North Carolina statute discriminating against out-of-state apple producers. The
Court accepted the Commission as a representative of the apple producers, since its "attempt ... to secure the industry's right to publicize
its [apple] grading system [was] central to the Commission's purpose."72 The Court concluded that the Commission did have "stand66. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating New Jersey's
prohibition on the importation of waste into the state, which forced the city of Philadelphia to
transport its waste to landfill sites farther away from the city); Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating North Carolina's requirement that ap·
pies sold in the state be marked with USDA grades, which raised the cost of doing business in
North Carolina for Washington growers and dealers, who grade their apples differently).
67. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975):
Without such limitations - closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially matters of
judicial self-governance - the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of
wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more compc·
tent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to
protect individual rights.
422 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added).
68. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village ofBellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (emphasis added).
69. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
70. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
71. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
72. 432 U.S. at 343-44 (emphasis added).
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ing to assert the rights of the individual growers and dealers in a
representational capacity." 73 While the rights asserted in Hunt did
have an impact on federal/state relations (a state statute was invalidated under the federal Constitution), the Court's ruling that standing
existed was premised on the private interests that were at stake.
Courts sometimes make exceptions to the prudential (but not the
constitutional) rules where it would be difficult or impossible for the
person whose rights are truly at stake to protect his own interest. 74
But that exception does not apply here. Congress could easily assert
its own right to regulate interstate commerce by streamlining its own
internal machinery or creating some new regulatory agency to prevent
state legislatures from invading any national interests in unburdened
commerce. 75 Thus, Congress can protect itself in this context, and
courts need not create an exception allowing private parties to assert
its rights. 76 The fact that courts allow individual plaintiffs to bring
dormant commerce clause suits in the face of these standing requirements suggests that some right, privilege, or immunity is involved in
dormant commerce clause litigation.
C.

Contemporary Dormant Commerce Clause Theory

The work of two contemporary scholars, Professors Donald Regan
and Julian Eule, further suggests that the commerce clause secures an
individual right - the right to be free from protectionist or discriminatory state commercial legislation. Regan argues that the Supreme
Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence has been, and should
be, focused on preventing states from engaging in purposeful economic
protectionism. 77 He argues that a state statute is protectionist if and
only if:
(a) the statute (or whatever) was adopted for the purpose of improving the competitive position of local (in-state) economic actors, just because they are local, vis-a-vis their foreign (by which I mean simply outof-state) competitors; and
(b) the statute (or whatever) is analogous in form to the traditional
73. 432 U.S. at 346 (emphasis added).
74. See, e.g.. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
75. See Eule, supra note 11, at 436.
76. See United States v. City of Yonkers, 592 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The district
court there held that private litigants could not assert the rights of Congress in order to challenge
the validity of a statute containing a legislative veto. The court declined to allow those litigants
to "dress up an individual complaint in the guise of a fundamental constitutional challenge, in a
context in which the institutions having a stake in the outcome have no desire to raise or litigate
such a challenge." 592 F. Supp. at 581. This reasoning would apply with equal force to the
dormant commerce clause if it were really national, not individual, interests which alone were at
stake.
77. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
107 S. Ct. 1637, 1648 (1987) (citing Regan approvingly).
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instruments of protectionism - the tariff, the quota, or the outright embargo (all of which can be on imports or exports). 7 8

This anti-protectionism principle is primarily grounded in a structural argument. 79 Protectionism cannot be allowed because it is hostile to the concept of Union. Protectionism is the economic equivalent
of war, and the resentment and retaliatory measures that it fosters are
practical obstacles to the maintenance of a federal union. Even
though this end is structural, the means chosen to achieve it involve
protection of the individual. Out-of-state competitors are protected
against legislation directed at them, and they are allowed to challenge
such legislation in court. This seems to be the very definition of a
right. 80
In contrast to the Consolidated Freightways court's assertion that
commerce clause litigation is primarily concerned with balancing national and state interests, 81 Regan believes that the anti-protectionism
principle is the only genuine national interest at stake in most dormant
commerce clause cases. 82 The other national interests asserted in
these cases, such as fostering uniform commercial regulation and economic efficiency, are "spurious"; 83 they are really just rhetorical shorthand for protectionism. Thus the only national interest genuinely
involved in every dormant commerce clause case is connected to
shielding the individual from unconstitutional protectionist state
action.
A competing theory of the dormant commerce clause also emphasizes the discriminatory impact on foreign economic actors. Professor
Julian Eule believes dormant commerce clause theory should focus on
the process-oriented protection of representational government. 84
Eule would have the Court strike down those state economic regula78. Regan, supra note 77, at 1094-95 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 1111-13.
80. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1189 (5th ed. 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROP•
ERTY § I (1936)): "A legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that the other
shall do a given act, or shall not do a given act."
81. See text at notes 18-19 supra.
82. Regan, supra note 77, at 1174-80. "Most dormant commerce clause cases" means, for
Regan, movement-of-goods cases, a category that includes all dormant commerce clause cases
except those involving: (I) state regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate transportation;
(2) state taxation of interstate commerce; and (3) the state as a market participant. Id. at 1098·
99. While the anti-protectionism principle is the sole ground for dormant commerce clause re·
view of movement-of-goods cases, Regan maintains that the principle itself applies to all dormant
commerce cases. Thus, "[s]tate regulations of the instrumentalities of transportation [like those
involved in Consolidated Freightways] or state taxes on commerce will be struck down if they
violate the anti-protectionism principle." Id. at 1099.
83. Id. at 1175. Regan maintains that the two cases most often cited for their national interest rhetoric are both about protectionism. Id. at 1176 (referring to Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), and H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949)). See also
Regan's discussion of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), id. at 1207. Pike is often
cited as the source of the modern balancing test used in dormant commerce clause cases.
84. See Eule, supra note 11, at 437-43.
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tions that disproportionately burden out-of-state actors who are not
represented in the local decisionmaking process. Such action is desirable, he argues, because "the discriminatory or protectionist nature [of
the regulation] represents a breakdown of the mechanism of democratic government." 85 Eule summarizes his position as follows:
When regulations promulgated by a legislative body fall solely or
predominantly on a group represented in the legislature there is cause to
believe the enactment will be rationally based, efficacious, and no more
burdensome than is necessary to achieve the proffered purpose. When
the state enacts legislation . . . falling principally on out-of-staters not
represented in the regulating body, such a presumption is
unwarranted. 86

The theories of Regan and Eule are not in complete agreement. 87
However, both theories focus on the impact that impermissible state
commercial regulations have on economic actors rather than the impact of those regulations on "spurious" national interests. Under
these theories individuals have a right to be free from protectionist or
discriminatory legislation directed against them - a right secured by
the commerce clause.
The reasoning in modern dormant commerce clause cases is consistent with the existence of such a right. 88 A representative example
is Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission. 89 The
North Carolina regulation struck down in that case required that only
USDA grades could be used on containers of apples sold in the state.
This prevented Washington apple producers from using their own
highly respected state grades, forced them to alter their marketing
strategies, and raised their cost of doing business in North Carolina
while their competitors in that state were unaffected. The Court's invalidation of the regulation can be seen as an attempt to protect outof-state actors from discriminatory, protectionist treatment. This
analysis aligns Hunt with the older commerce clause cases (Crutcher
85. Id. at 443.
86. Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
87. Indeed, Regan rejects Eule's "Carolene Products" representation-reinforcing theory of
the dormant commerce clause. He sees no warrant for assuming that out-of-state interests ought
to be represented in the local legislative process. Rather, so long as the state does not act with a
protectionist purpose by singling out foreigners for special treatment just because they are foreigners, the state may do as it pleases. See Regan, supra note 77, at 1160-65.
88. Cf id. at 1206-87 for an extended discussion of the Court's application of the anti-protectionism principle.
89. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). See also, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). The
Court there stated that "a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access
over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders." 437 U.S. at 627
(emphasis added). New Jersey's landfill restrictions were impermissible because they "impose[d]
on out-of-state commercial illterests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill
space." 437 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added). The Court here obviously seems concerned with the
impact of state regulation on persons, not merely on goods or national power. See text at note 76
supra; see also Regan, supra note 77, at 1221 (analyzing Hum).
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and Western Union) where similar treatment of out-of-state actors was
found to interfere with a right to engage in commerce secured by the
Constitution. 90 All of this evidence suggests that the commerce clause
secures a right to be free from discriminatory or protectionist state
economic legislation.
D.

The Relationship Between the Commerce Clause and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause

Assuming that the commerce clause does secure a right, privilege,
or immunity, it could not be an absolute right to engage in unfettered
trade. The Constitution does not establish a complete free market. 91
It is more accurate to say that the commerce clause protects residents
of one state from discriminatory or protectionist legislation directed at
them by another state. 92 The nature of this right can be better understood by comparing the commerce clause with the privileges and immunities clause of article IV. 93 This comparison both illustrates the
contours of the commerce clause right and demonstrates that a provision may secure individual rights as well as promote structural
concerns.
The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a "mutually
reinforcing relationship" between the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause. 94 This relationship explains the parallel
doctrinal development of the two clauses and the significant overlap of
the protections that they provide. 95 It is important to note in our discussion that historically,
both the commerce clause and the interstate privileges and immunities
90. See discussion of Crutcher and Western Union at notes 55-59 supra and accompanying
text. See also notes 99-107 infra and accompanying text (discussing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385 (1948), where a protectionist state statute was struck down under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV).
·
91. See Eule, supra note 11, at 434:
Congress' authority under the commerce clause is plenary and includes within it the power
to regulate free trade as well as to burden it, to encourage commercial intercourse or to
prohibit it....
The commerce clause thus cannot be said to establish and protect free trade or a national
marketplace as a fundamental constitutional value.
92. See Part Il.C supra.
93. "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several states." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
94. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 280 n.8 (1985) (quoting Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978)). In Hicklin, the Court struck down the "Alaska Hire
Act" as a violation of the privileges and immunities clause. The Court said,
Although appellants raise no Commerce Clause challenges to the Act, the mutually reinforcing relationship between the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the
Commerce Clause - a relationship that stems from their common origin in the Fourth
Article of the Articles of Confederation and their shared vision of federalism •.. - renders
several Commerce Clause decisions appropriate support for our conclusion.
437 U.S. at 531-32.
95. L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 6-33, at 411 n.19.
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clause of article IV [have] provided a setting for federal judicial intervention to control state and local impositions upon the citizens and residents
of other states, not only in the service of nationhood but also in the interest of the adversely affected citizens and residents themselves. 96

These close connections between the clauses and their common attention to both the structural concerns of nationhood and federalism
as well as individual interests should be expected. Each clause was
originally embodied in the same provision of the Articles of Confederation. Article IV of that document provides:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different States in this Union, ... the people of
each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other
State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants
thereof .... 97

This passage illustrates that even though the primary purpose of
these constitutional provisions may have been to foster national unity
(in both the Articles and the present Constitution), individual rights
are also protected under the clauses. Rather than merely stating that
national unity and uniformly regulated commerce were important federal interests, the framers guaranteed certain privileges to the "people
of each State." Thus the method chosen to achieve nationhood was
the affirmative protection of individual rights. 98
Interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause has been
"closely parallel to that of the commerce clause" 99 since the Supreme
Court's decision in Toomer v. Witsell. 100 The Court there recognized
the fundamental right of citizens of different states to do business on
substantially equal terms. 101 A South Carolina statute requiring outof-state fishermen to pay a much higher licensing fee than state residents was struck down as a violation of the article IV privileges and
immunities clause. 102 The Court maintained that the primary purpose
96. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
97. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, quoted in Piper, 470 U.S. at 280 n.7 (emphasis
added).
98. A concern for the commercial rights of individuals was shown in the first judicial interpretation of the article IV privileges and immunities clause, Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). Justice Washington there enumerated the fundamental rights
protected by article IV. Among them was the "right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or
to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade." 6 F. Cas. at 552. The natural rights theory
which underlay the Co!fie/d decision is currently in ill repute, but the Court has noted ~hat
"those privileges on Justice Washington's list would still be protected by the Clause." Piper, 470
U.S. at 281 n.10 (citing Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978)).
Therefore, a fundamental right to engage in interstate trade seems secured by the Constitution,
either by the privileges and immunities clause, the commerce clause, or the interaction of the
two.
99. L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 6-32, at 404-05.
100. 334 u.s 385 (1948).
IOI. See note 103 infra.
102. The statute required the payment of a license fee of $25 for each shrimp boat owned by
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of the privileges and immunities clause was to help fuse a collection of
independent, sovereign states into one nation. 103 In order to further
that goal, discrimination against citizens of other states is precluded
where there is no substantial reason for the differential treatment besides the mere difference in citizenship. 104 Since there was no demonstration in Toomer of any reasonable relationship between the danger
represented by noncitizens as a class and the severe discrimination
they were subjected to, the license fee could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.10s
This result could probably also have been reached using dormant
commerce clause principles. 106 Indeed, Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge believed that Toomer should have been decided under the commerce clause, and Justice Rutledge maintained that this "was exactly
that sort of state regulation the commerce clause was designed to
strike down." 107 Toomer thus illustrates the "bridge [built] between
federalism and personal rights" by the privileges and immunities
clause. 108 The commerce clause, so closely linked historically and
functionally to article IV, section 2, can also serve as such a bridge fostering nationhood, allocating power and securing personal rights,
all at once. This relationship between the commerce clause and the
privileges and immunities clause, and the recent scholarly work on
dormant commerce clause theory discussed above, both suggest that
the commerce clause could fulfill such a role.
Ill.

SECTION

1983

AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Since the commerce clause seems to secure a protective right for
individuals, it must be determined whether or not that right is a
"right, privilege, or immunity" within the meaning of section 1983.
The Supreme Court has not established any set of guidelines, and the
legislative history of section 1983 is not dispositive on this issue. However, both the unqualified statutory language and the failure of any of
the Supreme Court's limitations on section 1983 coverage to apply to
a state resident, while a fee of $2500 was imposed on each out-of-state boat. While the state
maintained that this was merely a regulation of its shrimp fishery designed to conserve shrimp,
the plaintiff out-of-state fisherman argued that it was intended to create a commercial monopoly
for South Carolina residents by excluding nonresidents from the fishery. The Court agreed.
103. 334 U.S. at 395. "In line with this underlying purpose, it was long ago decided that one
of the privileges which the clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing business in
State Bon terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State." 334 U.S. at 396 (empha·
sis added).
104. 334 U.S. at 396.
105. 334 U.S. at 399.
106. See L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 6-32, at 404.
107. 334 U.S. at 410.
108. L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 6-32, at 404.
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the commerce clause lend support to extending section 1983 to violations of that provision.
A. Language and History of Section 1983
The language of the statute itself is not qualified or limited in any
way. Presumably, therefore, it should apply when any federally secured right, privilege, or immunity (including the right, secured by the
commerce clause, to be free from discriminatory or protectionist state
economic legislation) is violated under color of state law. 109
The Supreme Court has taken the unrestricted nature of this language seriously. For example, the Court in Maine v. Thiboutot 110 interpreted the phrase "and laws" in section 1983 broadly. There the
Court had to decide whether the phrase "any rights ... secured by the
. . . laws" should mean what it says, or should instead be limited to
rights secured by some subset of laws. "Given that Congress attached
no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents' claim that petitioners violated the Social
Security Act." 111 Additionally, the Court has noted that the language
of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (section 1983's criminal counterpart) "is plain and
unlimited. . . . [I]ts language embraces all of the rights and privileges
secured to citizens by all of the Constitution and all of the laws of the
United States." 112 Since section 1983's reference to rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution is similarly unqualified,
courts should read it broadly and include the commerce clause right
within its protection.
Neither the origin nor the legislative history of section 1983 provides any reason to interpret section 1983's scope more narrowly. Section 1983 originated as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. 113
This act was one of the five civil rights acts enacted between 1866 and
1875 in order to elaborate and enforce effectively the new liberties in
the Reconstruction amendments. The 1871 Act was a response to the
lawless activities of the Klan and other vigilante groups harassing
freedmen and Union sympathizers in the South. State and local offi109. The Court used just this approach in interpreting the phrase "right or privilege ...
secured by the Constitution" in the criminal counterparts to§ 1983 (18 U.S.C. §§ 241 & 242).
"Both include rights or privileges secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Neither is qualified or limited. Each includes, presumably, all of the Constitution and laws of the
United States." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 797 (1966) (emphasis in original).
110. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). See also text accompanying notes 45 & 46 supra.
111. 448 U.S. at 4.
112. Price, 383 U.S. at 800 (emphasis in original). Section 241 provides in part, "If two or
more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States [they shall be subject to fine and imprisonment]." 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
113. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). See also Developments in the Law-Section
1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1142-69 (1977) [hereinafter Section 1983 and
Federalism].
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cials in the Southern states fostered this "vigilante terrorism" through
"tacit complicity and deliberate inactivity." 114 The congressional debates on the 1871 Act contain repeated references to the Klan atrocities, showing that Congress was primarily concerned with suppressing
the Klan's private lawlessness and preventing further abdication of
law enforcement responsibility by Southern officials pursuing a policy
of official inactivity. us
Section 1 of the Act, today's section 1983, was the least controversial part of the legislation. 116 Those members of Congress who did
attempt to define the scope of the "privileges and immunities" that
could be secured by the national government (thus defining the scope
of the Act) frequently cited Car.field v. Coryel/.1 17 That opinion "suggested that the privileges and immunities safeguarded by article IV
comprehended 'the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain
happiness and safety.' " 118 But reliance on Car.field may not be particularly helpful in determining the scope of section 1983, since "[i]t did
not directly confront the question whether article IV guaranteed substantive rights or only equality of enjoyment of such rights as the several states chose to extend to their citizens.'' 11 9
While one commentator has suggested that "[a]n expansive interpretation of the 1871 Civil Rights Act seems improbable in the light of
the political atmosphere in which the measure was passed," 120 opponents of the legislation recognized the breadth of the remedy established. Senator Thurman of Ohio said:
[The Act] authorizes any person who is deprived of any right, privilege,
or immunity secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, to
bring an action against the wrong-doer in the Federal courts, and that
without any limit whatsoever as to the amount in controversy. The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable character ... and yet by this
section jurisdiction of that civil action is given to the Federal courts instead of its being prosecuted as now in the courts of the States. 121

Justice Douglas quoted such opposition statements in his opinion for
the Court in Monroe v. Pape 122 (the source of modern section 1983
114. Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 113, at 1153.
115. Id. at 1154.
116. Id. at 1155.
117. Id. at 1155. Corjie/d, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), is discussed in note
98 supra.
118. Section 1983 and Federalism, supra note 113, at 1155 (quoting Corjie/d, 6 F. Cas. al
551-52).
119. Id. (footnote omitted).
120. Id. at 1156.
121. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., !st Sess., App. 216 (1871) (emphasis added), quoted i11
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 179-80 (1961).
122. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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doctrine) without saying whether supporters of the Act attempted to
refute or restrict this interpretation. This tends to support a reading of
section 1983 that is as broad as its opponents feared and its language
implies.
Although section 1983 was passed to support enforcement of the
fourteenth amendment, 123 interpreters of section 1983 should not be
compelled to tie the scope of the Act to that of the fourteenth amendment. After all, the expansion of the fourteenth amendment into the
areas of sex, alienage, and privacy has transported the amendment far
from the racial problems with which its authors were immediately
concerned. Hence, it would be no more faithful to section 1983's original purpose to link its scope to that of the fourteenth amendment than
to apply it broadly to all constitutional rights. And notwithstanding
the expansive interpretation given to the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court has not even tied the scope of section 1983 to the original purpose of the fourteenth amendment. Maine v. Thiboutot, for example, concerned a denial of benefits under the Social Security Act.
Thus, section 1983 has been applied in contexts very different from the
racial discrimination and vigilante violence that inspired it. 124
The inconclusive history of the Act allows two competing visions
of section 1983 to arise. 125 The first sees section 1983 addressing an
important but limited problem in post-Civil War race relations. In
this vision, the core concern of the provision, even today, should be
racial. In the second, section 1983 is the primary civil mechanism for
vindicating all constitutional rights. "The Court has toyed with intermediate approaches under which section 1983 protects only 'civil'
rights [as in Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900)] or
only 'personal' rights [as in Hague v. Committee/or Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939)], but these have never come to represent a
coherent approach to the section. If not confined by its origins, section 1983 seems destined to protect all constitutional rights." 126 The
123. The 1871 legislation was entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1873), quoted in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171.
124. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) {placing Social Security Act violations
within scope of§ 1983); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (§ 1983 successfully
used by a Jehovah's Witness to challenge a municipal solicitation ordinance as a violation of first
amendment rights of free speech and free exercise of religion).
125. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 483-86.
126. Id. at 486. This second vision prompts a further question: "[M]ay section 1983 be
given a broad functional scope, applied to many rights, without losing penetration within its core
area of historical concern?" Id. at 487. The concern here is that judges might be unwilling to
break down traditional state immunity privileges to vindicate all rights, thus hampering § 1983's
effectiveness in all areas, including its traditional racial ones. But this concern no longer works
against extending§ 1983 to the commerce clause right in the§ 1988 attorney fees context. No.
immunities need to be upset, since attorney fees can already be recovered from the state. Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). See also note 12 supra.
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Court's rejection of any limitation of section 1983 to "civiJ"121 or "personal"128 rights implies that the second, broader, vision should prevail.
B.

Contracts Clause Exception

There is some evidence that not all constitutional rights are rights
within the meaning of section 1983. It has been held, in Carter v.
Greenhaw 129 and Poirier v. Hodges, 130 that the contracts clause 131 does
not give rise to section 1983 rights. Yet these two cases are not persuasive. In 1885, the Greenhaw Court held that the contracts clause does
not directly secure any individual rights under the Constitution. The
only right secured to an individual by that clause, the Court argued, is
a right to have state laws impairing the obligation of contract judicially invalidated; this right, the Court maintained, is secured indirectly and incidentally.132
This reasoning does not stand up to analysis, since it fails to distinguish the contracts clause from any other constitutional provision. A
person claiming a violation of the first or fourteenth amendment seeks
to have the offending statute declared invalid as well. The "right" to
have offending state laws invalidated that the Greenhaw Court describes is actually a remedy. 133 It is a judicial response to a violation
of the right that is directly secured by the contracts clause: the right
to be free from state action impairing contractual obligations. The
Court's opinion does not support the exclusion of this right from section 1983 protection.
Similarly unpersuasive is Poirier v. Hodges, where the court also
refused to extend section 1983's coverage to the contracts clause. The
Poirier court believed section 1983 should only apply to violations of
the fourteenth amendment and to rights held applicable to the states
by incorporation through that amendment. 134 Since the contracts
127. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I, 5 (1980) ("under§ 1983 state 'officers may be made
to respond in damages not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights
Jaws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well'") (quoting
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966)).
128. See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972). Lynch is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 42-45 supra & note 155 infra.
129. 114 U.S. 317 (1885).
130. 445 F. Supp. 838 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
131. "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ...• " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
132. 114 U.S. at 322. The Court found no right under§ 1983 here, and it provided no help
in determining what rights might actually be secured by that section. "It might be difficult to
enumerate the several descriptions of rights secured to individuals by the Constitution, the deprivation of which, by any person, would subject the latter to an action for redress under[§ 1983]:
and, fortunately, it is not necessary to do so in this case." 114 U.S. at 323.
133. See notes 11 & 18 supra.
134. 445 F. Supp. at 842. The court argued that historically, § 1983 was intended by Congress to enforce the fourteenth amendment. They derived this intent from the fact that the statute was enacted pursuant to, and in order to implement, the fourteenth amendment. 445 F.
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clause has never been incorporated, the court held that it gave rise to
no rights redressable under section 1983. 135
Just why incorporation into the fourteenth amendment should be
of decisive importance here is unclear. Since the contracts clause is by
its terms applicable to the states, there was no need to apply it to the
states by incorporation. Surely first amendment rights would be protected by section 1983 if that amendment had been applied to the
states without first being incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.
The mere fact of incorporation alone cannot be fundamental. 136
These contracts clause precedents should not be given much
weight and certainly should not be the basis for excluding the commerce clause from section 1983 coverage. The Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue since 1885, and its recent cases suggest that it
would not reach the same conclusion today. The broad language used
by the Court in Price and Thiboutot 137 suggests that any right secured
by any part of the Constitution, whether it is the contracts clause, the
commerce clause, or the fourteenth amendment, should fall within the
coverage of section 1983.
C. Limitations on Section 1983 Protection of Statutory ''Rights"
Despite the expansive language of Thiboutot, which placed the denial of benefits under the Social Security Act within the purview of
section 1983, the Supreme Court has recognized that not all federal
statutes secure rights protected by section 1983. The Court's rules for
determining which statutory rights are protected by section 1983 may
provide guidance by analogy in determining which constitutional
rights are protected by section 1983.
The Thiboutot Court maintained that "the§ 1983 remedy broadly
encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional
law." 138 Thus, "the plain language of the statute," which included no
limitations or modifiers, "undoubtedly embrace[d] [violations of] the
Social Security Act."139
Yet two limitations on the application of Thiboutot 's broad interpretation of section 1983 were set out by the Court in Pennhurst State
Supp. at 842. "Hence, the Fourteenth Amendment is the 'centerpiece' of the statute, ... and the
scope of§ 1983 is identical with those rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 445 F.
Supp. at 842. But see notes 123-28 supra and accompanying text. The contracts clause has never
been incorporated into the sphere of fourteenth amendment protection. It is an independent
obligation of the states; thus the court could not include it in the fourteenth amendment centerpiece. No reference was made to the Carter v. Greenhow analysis.
135. 445 F. Supp. at 842.
136. Nor need the scope of§ 1983 be tied to the fourteenth amendment at all. See notes 12328 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 109-12 supra and accompanying text.
138. 448 U.S. at 4.
139. 448 U.S. at 4.
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School and Hospital v. Halderman. 14° First, in order for Thiboutot to
be controlling, the statute in question must create a "right" within the
meaning of section 1983. Second, section 1983 is not available where
the "governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of
its terms." 141
The Court failed to articulate any set of criteria by which to decide
whether a "right" under section 1983 exists. It did, however, distinguish the plaintiff in Thiboutot, who was personally entitled to funds
under the Social Security Act, from the plaintiffs in Pennhurst, who
could only claim that a state mental health program receiving federal
grant money had not provided adequate "assurances" to the federal
government that certain statutory standards had been met. The Court
concluded that it was "at least an open question whether an individual's interest in having a State provide those 'assurances' is a 'right
secured' by the laws of the United States within the meaning of
§ 1983." 142 Thus, courts deciding whether a section 1983 right exists
must not fail "to recognize the well-settled distinction between congressional 'encouragement' of state programs and the imposition of
binding obligations on the States." 143
The exclusive remedy exception precluded use of section 1983 in
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association.144 The Court there considered whether section 1983 was a
source of express congressional authorization of private suits under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 145 and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 146 Congress had provided
remedial provisions within the statutes themselves, and the Court held
that those provisions precluded coverage by section 1983. The Court
140. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Pem1hurst involved an attempt to bring a § 1983 claim under the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000·81
(1982). The federal grant program established by that statute required each state hoping to
receive funds to submit a spending plan for approval by the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services. That plan was to include assurances that any program receiving
funds would protect the human rights of the disabled consistently with the statutory "Bill of
Rights." 451 U.S. at 13-14. The plaintiff in Pe1111hurst argued that the "Bill of Rights" portion
of the Act granted to mentally retarded persons a right to appropriate treatment and services in
the setting "least restrictive of ... personal liberty," 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(1) and (2). and mnin·
tained that the state had violated that right. 451 U.S. at 8-9.
141. 451 U.S. at 28 (quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. l, 22 n.11 (1980) (Powell, J ..
dissenting)).
142. 451 U.S. at 28. The Court also concluded that the "Bill of Rights" provision of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act "simply does not create substantive
rights." 451 U.S. at 11. Rather than establishing enforceable rights and obligations, thnt provision did "no more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment." 45 l
U.S. at 19. This was "too thin a reed to support the rights and obligations read into it by the
court below." 451 U.S. at 19.
143. 451 U.S. at 27.
144. 453 U.S. I (1981).
145. 33 u.s.c. §§ 1251-66 (1982).
146. 33 u.s.c. §§ 1401-21 (1982).
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did not delineate how detailed the remedial provisions must be to foreclose section 1983 protection, but merely held that the provisions in
question were "sufficiently comprehensive." 147
These statutory exceptions are not readily applicable to the
cognizability of dormant commerce clause claims. First, the exclusive
remedy cases provide little guidance in determining what sort of rights
are covered by section 1983. The Court avoided that issue in Sea
Clammers and did not provide any helpful criteria in Pennhurst. But
the individual interest protected by the commerce clause, which is judicially enforceable through private actions, is stronger than the congressional "preference" 148 that did not support rights or obligations in
Pennhurst. The commerce clause confers an enforceable right on individuals by imposing a "binding obligation" on the states, rather than
merely "encouraging" states not to enact discriminatory or protectionist economic regulations. 149 In addition, the Pennhurst exclusive remedy exception does not apply here, since neither the Constitution nor
Congress provides an exclusive remedy for commerce clause violations. Congress can eliminate an undesirable state regulation merely
by enacting a supreme federal rule on that regulatory subject, while
individuals frequently exercise a private right of action by bringing
dormant commerce clause actions challenging state regulations. Thus,
private suit against a state official is not a novel remedy for commerce
clause violations; invoking section 1983 as the basis for such suits
merely allows the threshold requirement of a section 1988 attorney
fees claim to be satisfied. tso
D.

Types of Rights Protected by Section 1983

The broad, unqualified language of section 1983 and the Supreme
Court interpretations of that language in Maine v. Thiboutot 151 and
147. 453 U.S. at 19-21. Congress had created so many specific statutory remedies that the
Court found it hard to believe that it intended to preserve the§ 1983 right of action. 453 U.S. at
20. Both statutes contained "unusually elaborate enforcement provisions, conferring authority to
sue ... both on government officials and private citizens.... In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies [like suit under § 1983] for private citizens suing under" the Acts. 453
U.S. at 13-14. Those provisions similarly precluded the express remedy of § 1983 under the
Pe1111/zurst exclusive remedy exception. After reaching this conclusion, the Court did not go on to
consider whether any rights within the meaning of§ 1983 were secured by the Acts.
Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissented from this reasoning, arguing that the proper question with regard to federal statutes is not whether the § 1983 action has been preserved, "but
rather whether Congress intended to withdraw that right of action." 453 U.S. at 27. These
justices thought the burden was on the defendant to prove an exception "[b]ecause the § 1983
plaintiff is invoking an express private remedy that is, on its face, applicable anytime a violation
of a federal statute is alleged, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4." 453 U.S. at 27 n.11.
148. See note 142 supra.
149. Id.
150. See text at notes 3-6 supra.
151. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
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Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. 152 make it difficult to limit the protections of section 1983 to any particular subset of rights, such as civil
or personal rights. The Supreme Court has said that section 1983 covers "not only . . . violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil
rights laws, but ... violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well." 153 Similarly, the Court in Thiboutot stated that a
major purpose of section 1983 (and section 1988) "was to benefit those
claiming deprivations of constitutional and civil rights." 154 Thus the
Court seems to apply section 1983 even to those constitutional rights
which are not commonly referred to as civil rights.
A distinction between personal and property rights in a context
closely related to section 1983 was expressly rejected in Lynch. The
Court there argued that all property rights, almost by definition, are
personal:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy
property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or
the right to travel, is in truth a "personal right" . . . . In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and
the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the
other. 155

In spite of these interpretations, the Consolidated Freightways
court opined that section 1983 protects only civil rights, or " 'important personal rights akin to [the] fundamental rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' " 156 This view was first asserted in Holt v.
Indiana Manufacturing Co. 157 and was reaffirmed by the Eighth Circuit in First National Bank of Omaha v. Marquette National Bank of
152. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
153. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 5 (quoting Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30
(1966)).
154. 448 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
155. 405 U.S. at 552. The Lynch Court was construing the jurisdictional counterpart of
§ 1983, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982). See note 30 supra. That statute states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
Jaw to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State Jaw, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (1982).
Based on its reading of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, "the direct
lineal ancestor of§§ 1983 and [1343(a)(3)]," the Court was reluctant to
pare down§ [1343(a)(3)] jurisdiction - and the substantive scope of§ 1983 - by means of
the distinction between personal liberties and property rights, or in any other way. The
statutory descendants of§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 [§§ 1983 and 1343(a)(3)] must
be given the meaning and sweep that their origins and their language dictate.
405 U.S. at 545, 549 (emphasis added).
156. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139, 1146 (8th Cir.) (quoting
First Natl. Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Natl. Bank of Minneapolis, 636 F.2d 195, 198 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).
157. 176 U.S. 68 (1900). Sec also Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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Minneapolis. 158
In Holt a company brought suit under what is now section 1983 to
enjoin the collection of certain state taxes levied against the value of
several of its U.S. patents. The Company asserted that those patents
were not legally subject to state taxation, and thus suit was instituted
"to redress the deprivation, under color of a [tax] law of the State of
Indiana, of a right secured by the laws of the United States." 159 In
rejecting the Company's claim, the Court merely stated that the statute was enacted to enforce the fourteenth amendment, referred "to
civil rights only and [was] inapplicable here." 160 This interpretation,
however, was explicitly rejected in Thiboutot, where the Court stated
that section 1983 protects "constitutional and civil rights." 161 Thus,
section 1983 is applicable to more than "civil rights only."
The Eighth Circuit's discussion in Marquette National Bank is
more extensive, but unpersuasive. The plaintiff bank there asserted
that a state banking regulation conflicted with a federal regulatory
statute, depriving the bank of rights secured by that statute. 162 While
recognizing that Thiboutot clearly expands section 1983 beyond the
fourteenth amendment, the court refused to apply the broad language
of Thiboutot to the alleged statutory violation in Marquette National
Bank. 163 The Eighth Circuit based this refusal on a belief that
Thiboutot did not change the type of statutory rights protected by section 1983. The court reasoned that the rights at stake in Thiboutot, "of
beneficiaries to receive minimal subsistence and support under the
AFDC program so as to be able to obtain food and shelter[,] represent
important personal rights akin to the fundamental rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . '[S]uch fundamental human, highly
personalized rights are just the stuff from which § 1983 claims are to
158. 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981).
159. 176 U.S. at 69.
160. 176 U.S. at 72.
161. 448 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 153-54 supra.
162. The plaintiff bank claimed that 12 U.S.C. § 85 preempted the states' power to regulate
the interest rates of national banks. Section 85 authorizes national banks to charge interest at the
rate allowed to the most favored lender in their state. The Minnesota statute in question here
placed a 12% interest ceiling on charges by bank credit issuers (credit cards). The Eighth Circuit
ultimately held that the authority provided by § 85 was not a right, privilege, or immunity secured by federal law within the meaning of § 1983. Such authority is an incidental part of a
broad regulatory scheme and "is not in the nature of the rights protected by the Civil Rights
Act." 636 F.2d at 198.
163. The Eighth Circuit did not believe that the Supreme Court intended in Thiboutot to
affirm the existence of a § 1983 remedy for the violation of each and every federal law or the
deprivation of any right provided by a federal statute. The language in Thiboutot
suggests that section 1983 actions should be broadly permitted, even in areas outside welfare, First Amendment, and social security cases. However, the Court fails to say this explicitly. In light of the narrow holding in the case concerning social security cases, the
general language in the opinion, and the major ramifications of such a holding, we do not
think such an expansion of section 1983 is justified.
636 F.2d at 197-98 n.2.
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be made.' " 164 Because the extension of section 1983 was not expressly
mandated by Thiboutot, the Marquette National Bank court concluded
"that section 1983 does not authorize a suit for an alleged violation of
a purely economic regulatory statute affecting only commercial
institutions." 165
There are problems with this analysis, however. First, the Eighth
Circuit's attempt to limit section 1983 to personalized rights is inconsistent with the expansive language and spirit of Thiboutot and
Lynch. 166 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit's attempt to limit the scope
of Thiboutot to its narrow holding is not entitled to much deference.
The Supreme Court spelled out the limits to Thiboutot in Pennhurst
and Sea Clammers. 161 The implication of those decisions is that all
federal statutory rights are cognizable under section 1983 if an actual
substantive right, rather than a mere "congressional preference," is
involved, and if the statute securing the right provides no exclusive
remedy. No mention is made in those decisions of a limitation based
on the nature of the right involved. There is no requirement that the
right be highly personal or a civil right.
Thus section 1983 can be e:x,tended to protect a broad range of
statutory and constitutional rights. The language of the statute is unqualified, seemingly applying to violations of the individual right secured by the commerce clause, and its legislative history fails to put
clear limits on its coverage. Those exceptions to section 1983 protection that have been judicially developed - the Pennhurst standards
and the contracts clause exception - are narrow and inapplicable to
the commerce clause. These factors, and the Court's refusal to limit
section 1983's coverage to any particular set of rights, support using
section 1983 to remedy violations of rights secured by the commerce
clause.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Rather than acting solely to allocate power between the federal
and state governments, the commerce clause also secures an important
individual right. The individual right to be free from discriminatory
or protectionist state economic legislation, protected by the commerce
clause, is an important part of the constitutional system. Since the
unqualified language and expansive Supreme Court interpretations of
section 1983 clearly embrace this constitutional right, dormant com164. 636 F.2d at 198 (quoting Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569, 579
(5th Cir. 1969)).
165. 636 F.2d at 199 n.3.
166. See notes ll0-11 & 154-55 supra and accompanying text.
167. See text accompanying notes 140-50 supra.
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merce clause challenges to protectionist state legislation should be
considered cognizable section 1983 claims.
-

Gregory A. Kalscheur

